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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee has erred in its Statement of the Case (Appellee's Brief, p. 3) in
its declaration that the trial court has never issued a signed order denying the motion to
withdraw. The Order denying the motion was signed on August 14, 1995, and was
included as Item No. 7 in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief.

ARGUMENT
Appellant has some difficult addressing the State of Utah/Appellee's Brief,
since the State did not refer specifically to the points raised in Appellant's Brief. In fact,
Appellant wonders again if the State has actually read the Appellant's Brief, since there
are so many misstatements in the State's Brief. Appellant incorporates his original Brief
herein by reference, and particularly addresses the points raised by the State, hereafter:

POINT I
A READING OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE SENTENCING HEARING
MAKES IT VERY CLEAR THAT THE JUDGE PRECLUDED ANY
POSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING ANY ARGUMENTS RELATIVE TO
SENTENCING GUIDELINES OR THE TERMS OF THE
PROSECUTOR'S PLEA BARGAIN
Appellant has previously pointed out that the guidelines were adhered to
with regard to Josh St. Clair by Adult Probation and Parole. Appellant's Brief, p. 4. The
Appellant recognizes that the trial court had discretion to treat the defendants differently,
as long as there is a reasonable basis for the difference, which difference is to be set forth
1

as a finding. State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). No such finding was made
concerning the treatment of Josh St. Clair and, indeed, there is no evidence on the record
that the difference in treatment was even considered by the court. Such a sentencing,
given without regard to the mandates of the guidelines and the case law, constitutes an
abuse of the trial court's discretion and a denial of the Appellant's constitutional rights
under Article I, Section 24. It is appropriate for any issue of constitutional law to be first
raised before the Appellate Court, whether or not brought up before the trial court.
Specifically, the Appellate Court acknowledged, in State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990), that:
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have allowed
a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be considered for the first time
on appeal. "[I]n certain cases we may consider the failure to comply with Rule
11(5) and Gibbons as error sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised
on appeal to this court." State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam). See also State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987).
Although we acknowledge that the trial judge made a greater effort to
ensure that defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly given than in Valencia
. . . , because of the fundamental rights involved, we conclude the trial court's
deficiencies in determining whether the guilty plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily constitute plain error. [Footnote omitted.] We therefore will address
this issue for the first time on appeal.
The State's Brief states (p. 4) that "the defendant requested the trial court
to impose the guidelines sentence," which may have led the court to believe that it was
"free to disregard the guidelines." The State's Brief contains no citation in the record to
any request made by the Appellant for the court to impose the guidelines sentence, and in
2

reading the transcript of all three hearings, Appellant can find no such request. Rather,
the judge's outburst at the beginning of the hearing of January 12, 1995, had the effect of
placing a damper on the ability of Appellant's counsel to make any references whatsoever
to the terms of the plea bargain and to the recommendations. He simply was precluded
by the judge's anger from introducing any objection of any kind, and even from requiring
the prosecutor to read the Statement of Defendant and Order, prepared by the prosecutor,
which specifically stated (Appellant's Brief Addendum) that the prosecutor was going to
recommend a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation before the Appellant was sentenced. Had
the prosecutor been required to refresh his memory by reading the Statement, it is very
likely that the sentence would have been different. However, the judge's anger toward
both counsel precluded that possibility. The Appellant cannot be held responsible for the
circumstances created by the trial court, which made it impossible for his counsel to make
requests or objections he otherwise would have made.
POINT II
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECTOR TO RECOMMEND THE SIXTY-DAY
EVALUATION MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THERE WERE TRUE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT AND THAT OF JASON BLACK, HIS
CO-DEFENDANT
The State reminds us that the differences between the co-defendants is
nicely" shown by Detective Sutherland's comments in both PSIs. The Appellant wishes
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to point out that Detective Sutherland stated his belief concerning the two defendants, but
nowhere has the State provided any showing of Detective Sutherland's qualifications to
make such findings. The State further fails to mention that despite this difference in the
detective's beliefs, use of the State's own guidelines provided similar conclusions as to
the best recommendation for each youth. (It is ironic that the State points out that despite
the detective's concerns, he recommended that this defendant receive a sentence similar
to Black's; it seems foolish to suggest that the court should believe the Detective's
comment, but disbelieve his sentence recommendation. The detective is either credible or
not; the State cannot have it both ways.)
It may well have been Detective Sutherland's concerns about the Appellant
that let the county prosecutor to recommend a diagnostic evaluation (indeed, these
thoughts were expressed by Defendant's counsel at the time of sentencing, [transcript of
January 12, 1995, pp. 10-15]), making the prosecutor's onus even greater for his failure
to keep his bargain.
The net effect was that the law was not uniformly applied to the Appellant
at the time of his sentencing.
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POINT III
THE APPELLANT HAS APPEALED THE PROPRIETY OF THE
ACCEPTANCE OF HIS PLEA UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING
The State has continually referred to Defendant/Appellant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and has not addressed the Appellant's point that the trial court
was wrong in accepting the plea, given the circumstances at the time of sentencing.
Those circumstances were:
One, that the prosecutor failed to acknowledge the terms of the plea bargain
he had made, and specifically Paragraph 13 of the Statement of the Defendant, which
contained those terms; and that when defense counsel tried to bring those terms to the
court's attention he was stopped by the trial judge, who proceeded to castigate both
counsel and refused to listen to the proof contained in the Statement.
Two, the Appellant knew that he had the same recommendation from Adult
Probation and Parole as did Co-defendant Black, knew that the prosecution concurred in
the recommendation, knew that Co-defendant Black (two years older than he) had been
given a suspended sentence wherein he served only 120 days in jail, was ordered to pay
restitution, and was placed on three years probation; with the result that the Defendant
had every expectation of receiving like treatment, and did not therefore have a "free"
choice, without undue influence and pressure, in entering his plea.

5

The State has made another misstatement in its Note 6, appended to Point
III, stating that "the defense attorney actually asked to expedite the sentencing hearing."
The record shows (page 10) that it was Mr. Jeppesen, Wis prosecutor, who asked that the
sentencing be moved up, stating that he was requesting a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation
and that AP&P would not need further time than that to arrange for the evaluation. It
seems obvious that the prosecutor was expecting the judge to order the ninety-day
evaluation at the time of sentencing. However, at the time of sentencing the prosecutor
did not make that request and the evaluation was not ordered.
Secondly, the State has also totally disregarded herein the entitlement of the
Appellant to the benefit of his bargain. That entitlement was treated in Appellant's Brief.
It seems absolutely ludicrous to expect the Defendant to make a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea before any occurrence that informs him the plea is not to his benefit. The plea
has to be a "voluntary and intelligent choice . . . entered knowingly and voluntarily."
Salazarv. Warden. 852 P.2d 988 (Utah S. Ct.1993).
Lastly, in State v. Smith. 777 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme
Court allowed the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial judge did not
strictly comply with Rule 11. The court ruled that the test for complying with Rule 11 is
the strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons, and found then that neither the plea
bargain affidavit nor the trial judge clearly communicated that defendant would be
required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence of five years.
6

Parenthetically, Appellant requests a ruling of clarification with regard to
this point. Since Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied by the trial
court in an unsigned Minute Entry of January 30, 1995, and the Notice of Appeal was
timely filed on February 17, 1995, despite the Appeals Court's dismissal of the appeal
with regard to the withdrawal of the guilty plea on April 20, 1995, followed by the entry
of a signed order of denial of the motion on August 14, 1995, does not Rule 4(c), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, automatically apply as of the date of August 14? (A notice
of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision but before the entry of the judgment
of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.)
Appellant requests a clarification of the effect on the April dismissal on the Rule 4(c)
application to the August 14 signed order.

POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAS NEVER SUGGESTED
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS BIASED; WE BELIEVE,
HOWEVER, THAT HIS JUDGMENT WAS MOMENTARILY
CLOUDED BY HIS IRRITATION, ANGER, OR PIQUE, AND
THE DECISION RENDERED THEREUNDER BECAME
PERSONAL, RATHER THAN JUDICIAL.
Point VI of Appellant's Brief describes the mood of the sentencing judge as
it was reflected toward the prosecutor and defense counsel at the time of sentencing.
Nothing further need be added here except that the Brief clearly does not accuse the judge
of bias, but rather of emotion, causing his decision to go beyond the realm of judicial
7

discretion. No affidavit of bias is necessary under these circumstances. The transcript
adequately sets forth the words and even the tone of the hearing. This Court has
jurisdiction to review the trial court's personal discretion. Appellant's Brief at 16.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions set forth in Appellant's Brief are still appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o $ _ day of December, 1995.

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Appellant
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